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 Guest Editorial 
 Broadening the Focus 
 TOM  BULLER ,  ADAM  SHRIVER , and  MARTHA  FARAH 
 The Humanistic Focus 
 Over the past dozen or so years neuroethics has become a rich and dynamic fi eld 
that has brought together individuals from a variety of disciplines and interests to 
consider issues that lie at the intersection of ethics and neuroscience. During this 
period there has been a signifi cant amount of important empirical and philosophical 
work on a range of topics at this intersection; however, there has been compara-
tively little work on this intersection as it applies to nonhuman animals. In fact, it 
is fair to say that neuroethics has had a distinct and almost exclusive “humanistic 
focus.” Our hope with this special section is to broaden this focus and to provoke 
and encourage discussion of nonhuman animals within neuroethics. 
 There are a number of explanations for neuroethics’ humanistic focus. 
 Mind and Agent 
 According to a familiar description, neuroethics examines issues pertaining to the 
ethics of neuroscience and the neuroscience of ethics.  1  Within the fi rst of these 
elements, discussion has focused on a variety of existing and future neurosci-
entifi c interventions that enable the monitoring and manipulation of the brain, 
for example, the use of neuroimaging to “read” the brain and detect thoughts, 
lies, and other psychological states, and the use of pharmacological and other 
means to enhance cognition. Discussion of these interventions has focused, in 
particular, on potential invasions of privacy and threats to “cognitive liberty,” and 
concerns about authenticity and fairness. 
 Underlying the interest in the monitoring and manipulation of the brain lies a 
humanistic view of mind: to have a mind is to have thoughts, beliefs, and other 
“higher-level” psychological states, and these states are generally accessible only 
in a privileged fi rst-person way. What interests and concerns us about neuroimaging 
is that it can, in principle, reveal a person’s conscious inner mental life; that is to 
say, it can access mental intentions and other mental contents that we previously 
thought to be private. Similarly, the worry that cognitive enhancement poses a 
threat to authenticity presupposes that there is an authentic self, and authenticity 
is commonly understood in terms of psychological integration. 
 If this is correct, it is obvious why neuroethics has had little interest in non-
human animals. For a common belief in regard to the minds of animals is that 
they lack such a sophisticated conscious mental life. In general, we may be quite 
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willing to accept that animals are sentient, that they have preferences, and that 
there is a rich variety of animal cognition; but we are skeptical that they have thoughts 
and beliefs. This skepticism is aided by a fear of uncritical anthropomorphism. 
 In regard to the second of the aforementioned elements—the neuroscience of 
ethics—the matter is, perhaps, even clearer. One of the core questions that has 
been addressed is, “What are the implications that advances in neuroscience have 
for the law and morality?” This question is, obviously, dependent on the initial 
belief that we are, for the most part, intentional agents capable of moral decision-
making and acting responsibly, and that the law and morality assume this to be 
the case. Our initial belief about nonhuman animals, however, is that it is inap-
propriate to view them in this light: the behavior of nonhuman animals is judged 
to be predominantly instinctive or hardwired, rather than intentional and volun-
tary. This is not to deny that some animals, for example, chimps, have complex 
social and group behaviors and are capable of morally questionable actions like 
deception, but even in these cases we are reluctant to conceive of these animals as 
moral agents. 
 Epistemic and Methodological Concerns 
 One of the reasons why neuroscience is thought to be compelling, and, perhaps, 
challenging, is because it is thought to be in a privileged position to explain the 
mind. Although there may be no agreement as to the specifi c relationship between 
mind and brain, within neuroethics there is general agreement that this relationship is 
robust, if not even necessary. In broad terms neuroethics follows neuroscience in 
adopting an internalist, brain-based understanding of the mind. Accordingly, we 
seek to identify the neural processes that underlie psychological states, and these 
processes are viewed as evidence of what is “really going on.” For conceptual and 
practical reasons, however, a different approach has been adopted in regard to 
animal cognition. In contrast to the internalist perspective of the human mind, the 
approach taken to the study of animal minds has been broader and more externalist 
in nature. For example, one of the infl uential approaches to the study of animal 
minds, cognitive ethology, supports the “comparative, evolutionary and ecologi-
cal study of animal thought processes.”  2  In other words, in order to understand 
the animal mind, we should take fully into account the place and nature of the 
animal within its natural environment and evolutionary history, in addition to 
focusing on the underlying neurophysical states. 
 Furthermore, as we are aware, there are substantial practical and ethical chal-
lenges to the study of animal minds. Our ability to use neuroimaging to “read” 
a person’s thoughts is in part the result of our ability to design highly structured 
and specifi c tasks, and of the subject’s ability to comprehend and follow what he 
or she is being asked to do. To take a somewhat fanciful example, during the 2010 
World Cup, Paul the Octopus showed a remarkable ability to predict the results of 
matches during the tournament—he guessed 8/8 matches correctly. It is fair to say 
that there is considerable debate about the validity of Paul’s predictions, with crit-
ics pouring scorn on the claimed abilities of this cephalopod. If Paul were human, 
then we could, in theory (and maybe in practice) use neuroimaging to determine 
whether he does genuinely recognize the fl ags of various countries, or, perhaps, 
whether he is making a decision or has a preference for one outcome rather 
than another. Because Paul is a cephalopod, however, and, according to our 
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understanding, lacking in the appropriate cognitive and linguistic capacities to 
participate in an experiment that could, in principle, determine what is “really 
going on,” we cannot readily use neuroimaging to validate his “predictions” or 
determine whether, in fact, he is making any predictions at all. 
 There is also a further challenge presented by nonhuman animal minds, namely, 
their difference from human minds. Our ability to identify the neural processes 
that underlie mental events rests, in considerable part, on our familiarity with the 
human brain and its very specifi c functions. This familiarity can be confi rmed 
or revised through the use of further neuroscientifi c investigation, particularly 
neuroimaging, and enables us to discover the empirical correlations. In the case of 
nonhuman animals we can gain some understanding of their minds through com-
parison of brain architecture and function to human and other animal minds; 
however, the more different the animal mind is from the human mind, the more 
diffi cult it will be to understand the animal mind. 
 The Scope of Animal Neuroethics 
 A reasonable defi nition of animal neuroethics would encompass all of the ethical 
issues raised by neuroscience in connection with animals. These arise from the 
many different ways in which humans intervene on animal brains. 
 The most common goal of brain interventions with animals is the reduction of 
unwanted behaviors that arise in reaction to their human-controlled environments. 
Pets and zoo animals often endure severely restricted freedom of movement, and 
confi nement of livestock in factory farms is extreme, with enclosures so small or 
crowding so dense that an individual may be unable to turn. These environments 
cause anxiety, aggression toward other animals and humans, and compulsive self-
injurious behaviors. Psychopharmacology has been used to lessen these problem 
behaviors in pets, zoo animals, and livestock, with a marked increase in the use 
of neuropsychiatric medications such as selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors, 
tricyclic antidepressants, and benzodiazepines in pets.  3  
 Animals are also used as subjects in medical research on neurological and 
psychiatric disorders and in basic research on the brain, generally as models for 
human beings. Although all animal research raises ethical dilemmas, research on 
animal brains evokes some unique quandaries. Such research affects animals’ 
experience more directly than research on other bodily systems, and research 
involving the important but aversive phenomena of pain, depression, and anxiety 
is especially problematic.  4  In addition, the greater the similarity of an animal 
species’ brain to the human brain, the more valid the model, and also the greater 
the likelihood of awareness and risk of suffering. 
 A distinctive set of issues arise in connection with relatively new research meth-
ods for crossing boundaries between species and between animals and machines. 
These include the creation of transgenic animals whose brain function has been 
altered by genes from a different species and neural chimera, in which an animal 
incorporates functioning neural tissue from another species.  5  They also include 
brain–machine interfaces, in which animals’ brains are implanted with electrodes 
that enable brain activity to control robotic devices.  6  
 Finally, neuroscience is giving us new ways of inferring the psychological states 
of animals, including the state of suffering. These developments build on endo-
crine and autonomic nervous system measures of stress to include measures of 
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central nervous system function from postmortem samples or functional brain 
imaging.  7 , 8  Such developments have the potential to move forward the debate 
over whether, and to what extent, animals suffer. 
 Special Section on Neuroethics and Animals 
 The articles that are included in this section focus on two issues that are central to 
the discussion of neuroethics and animals: the use of animals in research and sen-
tience and the moral status of animals. In his article, Andrew Fenton argues that 
we should adopt a different moral framework in regard to the use of chimpanzees 
in research. According to Fenton, chimpanzees have the capacity to dissent from 
participating in research, because they possess the capacity to feel pain, can antic-
ipate future occurrences of pain and distress, and can express the preference that 
the pain be stopped. In this regard, although there are substantial differences 
between chimpanzees and children, these capacities suggest that the appropriate 
perspective that should be adopted in regard to the use of chimpanzees in research 
is through the lens of pediatric ethics. In their article, Michael Rollin and Bernard 
Rollin question the validity and ethics of animal models of human psychiatric 
disease. In broad terms, we may say that the use of animals in research is justifi ed 
(if at all) to the extent to which the animal can be legitimately be regarded as a 
valid model, that is to say, the extent to which the information gained in the 
research can be appropriately translated to the human context. Rollin and Rollin 
argue, however, that this condition cannot be met, because “the shaky construct 
validity of the diseases as described in humans renders them impossible to trans-
late to animal models.” Furthermore, if there were a valid animal model, then this 
would mean that the phenomenology of the animal’s experience would be closely 
similar to a human’s; but if this were the case, then one might wonder what moral 
difference exists between animal and human. 
 The articles by Adam Shriver and by Sherry Loveless and James Giordano focus 
on the matter of animal pain. In his article, Shriver argues that, contrary to a com-
mon understanding, there are good reasons to think that pleasure and pain are not 
“symmetrical,” that is to say, that pleasure is not simply the absence of pain. 
Rather, the evidence suggests, as Shriver states, that “pleasure and pain are not 
just two different experiences but in fact are two wholly different  types of experi-
ence.” Accordingly, as Shriver argues, pain and pleasure might not be measurable 
along a single scale, and, hence, we should be wary of judging actions in terms of 
the ratio of pleasure to pain. This conclusion has important implications for animal 
research, for it suggests that the use of animals in research that seeks to minimize 
suffering in humans should be viewed differently than the use of animals in 
research that seeks to understand positive experiences. The issue of an animal’s 
capacity to feel pain is central to the article by Loveless and Giordano. In their 
article, the authors argue that an organism’s capacity to feel pain “represents a 
minimum criterion on which to base and predicate moral consideration and 
actions,” and that there is clear neuroscientifi c evidence to conclude that animals 
can feel pain, fear, and distress. Furthermore, this means that we have a respon-
sibility to develop and institute protections for animal welfare. Finally, in his article, 
Tom Buller attempts to show how a neuroethics framework can inform current 
debates about the mentality and moral status of animals and can narrow the 
“epistemic gap” between science and ethics. Buller argues that neuroscience can help 
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identify properties relevant to the mentality of animals that might satisfy both 
science and ethics, and that neuroethics can provide a framework for evaluating 
these properties. 
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